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Table 1. Zero-inflated Negative Binomial 
Regression of the Number of Landlords
Agricultural economists have long 
recognized that risks play an essential role 
in the production decisions and marketing 
actions.  Risk management is clearly 
important to farm operators as well as to 
researchers and policy makers. 
Although prior studies have made
The objective of this study is to investigate 
how and to what extent risk and risk 
attitudes affect a farmer’s choice of the 
number of landlords.
It is unrealistic to model the entire zero 
count data generating process by using a 
single specification.
Zero-inflated model provides a way to 




Coef. Robust. Err zP > | z | [95% Conf.Interval]
# of Landlord
CV 0.637 0.179 3.560 0.000 0.286 0.987
Insurance Purchase ‐0.014 0.007 ‐2.000 0.045 ‐0.028 0.000
Debt Asset Ratio 0.002 0.001 2.470 0.013 0.000 0.004
Net Wealth 0.000 0.000 3.710 0.000 0.000 0.000




Although prior studies have made 
considerable efforts to understand farm 
operators' risk management activities, 
almost no information exists about the 
choice of the number of landlords (the total 
number of landlords that a tenant operator 
has at a specific time) as a way to deal with 
risks In the U S abo t 58% farmers
Three steps investigation:
1. Model membership in the Always Zero 
Group:  binary choice model (e.g., logit)
2. Model membership in the Not Always 
Zero Group: either PRM or NBRM
3. Compute observed probabilities as a 
Professional Manag. Service 0.012 0.003 4.020 0.000 0.017 0.006
Farming Exper. 0.030 0.005 5.540 0.000 0.019 0.040
Farming Exper.^2 0.000 0.000 ‐2.420 0.015 0.000 0.000
Using Share Contract(s) 1.285 0.275 4.680 0.000 0.746 1.824
_cons ‐0.423 0.334 ‐1.270 0.206 ‐1.078 0.232
Inflate
CV ‐0.333 0.530 ‐0.630 0.529 ‐1.372 0.706
Insurance Purchase 0.051 0.125 0.410 0.685 ‐0.195 0.297
Debt Asset Ratio 0.013 0.007 1.840 0.066 ‐0.001 0.027
Net Wealth 0.000 0.000 1.670 0.095 0.000 0.000
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The data used in this study come from 
three sources: 
 The 1999 Agricultural Economics and 
Land Ownership Survey (AELOS)
 The 1999 Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey (ARMS)
 The 1990 1999 Regional Economic risks.  In  the U.S., about 58% farmers 
operate lands at least partially rented from 
others by various types of contracts.  Many 
of these tenant operators rented land from 
more than one landlord (see Figure 1).  
Some of them both rented farmland from 
other landlord(s) and rented own land out to 
mixture of the two groups
Professional Manag. Service 0.059 0.015 3.790 0.000 0.028 0.089
Farming Exper. ‐0.011 0.012 ‐0.930 0.353 ‐0.034 0.012
Farming Exper.^2 ‐75.777 33.086 ‐2.290 0.022 ‐140.625 ‐10.930
Using Share Contract(s) ‐1.910 0.905 ‐2.110 0.035 ‐3.683 ‐0.136
lnalpha ‐1.071 0.068 ‐15.780 0.000 ‐1.204 ‐0.938
alpha 0.343 0.023 0.300 0.392
Count Equation: Factor Change in Expected Count for Those Not Always 0
be ^ b e ^ b S t d X S D o f X
CV 0.637 1.890 1.074 0.112
I Ph 00 1 4 0 986 09 7 4 18 4 7
 The 1990-1999 Regional Economic 
Information Systems (REIS)
Results
 Likelihood-ratio test comparing ZIP to 
ZINB indicates that ZINB fits better.
 Results are presented in Table 1 and 
Methodology
We consider the following models : the 
Poisson regression model (PRM), the 
the others.  In general, farms with higher 
coefficient of variation (CV) and/or using 
share contracts seem to contract with more 
landlords (USDA 2001).
Figure 2. Changes in the Predicted Probabilities 











Figure 1. Frequency of U.S. 
Farms’ Number of 
Landlords (%) in 1999
In light of these 
facts, a fundamental 
question arises
Insurance Purchase ‐0.014 0.986 0.974 1.847
Debt Asset Ratio 0.002 1.002 1.058 26.420
Using Share Contract(s) 1.285 3.615 1.773 0.446
Figure 2.  Risk and risk preference are 
important determinants of the number of 
landlords.
 The CV for net farm income and debt 
asset ratio of the farm both have positive 
effects on the predicted number of 
landlords; on the other hand purchasing
negative binomial regression Model 
(NBRM), and the hurdle regression model 
(HRM).  In practice, the PRM rarely fits due 
to overdispersion.  The NBRM addresses 
the failure of the PRM by allowing 

















































LL=0 LL=1 LL=2 LL=3 LL=4 LL>=5  Percent
question arises 
regarding the number 
of landlords: do farm 
operators choose the 
number of landlords 
as a way to deal with 
the risks?
landlords; on the other hand, purchasing 
insurance and using professional farm 
management service decrease the 
number of landlords.
 Figure 2 shows, one std increase in CV 
decreases the predicted possibility of 
having zero landlord by 0.02; at the same 
However, all three models assume that 
every farm has a positive probability of 
renting farmland from landlord(s). Although 
it is quite common for most of farmers to 
have chances to lease from at least one 
landlord, still some of the operators would 










time, it increases the probabilities of 
having two and three landlords.
 Other results and implications will be 
discussed.
never (consider or have an opportunity to) 
rent any land from others, given a certain 
time period.
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